In this paper we study competition among non-benevolent local governments for mobile firms and evaluate the consequences of imposing alternative regimes of competition.
Introduction
While competition among states and local governments to attract business is widespread in the United States, it is often accompanied by great debate and concerns about the possibility that any potential benefits from competition might be outweighed by the distortions induced by the tax incentives provided.
The literature on capital tax competition has found adverse welfare consequence of competition among local governments, associated with the fiscal externalities that result because the tax bases are mobile (see Wilson, 1999 , for a survey). When, in some instances, authors have found potential welfare-improving properties of interjurisdictional competition, the driving force is traced back to limiting the self-serving behavior of governments. Competition in such cases reduces the taxation powers of governments that are partially interested in maximizing the size of the public sector or in capturing rents (see for example, Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Wrede, 1998; Rauscher, 2000) .
In a widely cited piece, Burstein and Rolnick (1994) proposed that the use of discretionary incentive programs should be discouraged by the federal government. They argued that competition through uniform taxation and spending policies may lead to a more efficient allocation of resources for the provision of public and private goods. Results in the literature about the optimal choice of policy instruments to regulate interjurisdictional competition at the federation level are scarce. Using an optimal taxation argument, Holmes (1995) finds that banning discretionary taxation to attract firms improves welfare, because it prevents governments from applying different tax rates to agents, which are essentially of the same type, in different locations. On the other hand, Owens and Sarte (2002) find, in a model where firm migration is costly and firms have market power, that targeted subsidies that alleviate moving costs can help attain a second-best outcome. They warn, however, that when dynamics are considered, such policies can induce transitional welfare costs in the short-run.
The issue of policy instruments choice is analyzed in more detail in the literature on incentive theory and incomplete contracts. Persson et al. (1998) and Laffont (1999) , for example, examine the design of constitutions to prevent the capture of politicians by interest groups. They suggest alternatives such as separation of powers among branches of the government and the provision of incentive payments to politicians. In the same line of thought, Martimort (1996a,b) directs attention to the multiprincipal nature of governments, since, he argues, the relationships between government bodies and their regulatory tasks can be viewed as a set of competing contracts.
In this paper we examine the problem of nonbenevolent local governments competing for mobile firms, and we evaluate the consequences of imposing alternative regimes of competition. Mobile firms have private information and a system of competition with sophisticated policy instruments allows the local governments to offer the firms larger information rents than under a system of competition with coarser policy instruments. Information rents are socially costly and imposing constitutional constraints on the availability of policy instruments may be socially desirable. The question of policy instrument choice has been analyzed by Boyer and Laffont (1999) in an environment in which a regulator with a private agenda designs environmental policy for a polluting monopolist. The authors find that constraints that force politicians to use coarser policy instruments may be desirable because they limit the regulator's ability to redistribute rents. In their model, politicians display non-benevolence by representing the interests of alternating political majorities with different stakes on the firm's rents. In contrast with the problem of a single regulator maximizing social welfare, the authors find that when alternating regulators have private agendas, the use of sophisticated incentive mechanisms may be dominated by less sophisticated, non-discretionary policies.
In a related problem, Becker and Mulligan (2003) have found that when government policy responds to the actions of interest groups, welfare can be improved by an apparently suboptimal tax system of less sophisticated instruments, because it reduces the overall inefficiency of the public sector and creates pressures to suppress the size of governments.
We find that, even in the absence of self-serving behavior from politicians, imposing constitutional constraints on the choice of instruments for interjurisdictional competition may be welfare-improving. In our model, regulators-politicians-are in charge of industrial policy in different locations and compete for the exclusive services of firms. Individual firms have private information about their marginal production cost. Politicians thus face the double problem of providing incentives to firms to operate in their location and inducing self-selection.
It is socially costly to provide incentives, and regulators pursuing private agendas fail to estimate correctly the social cost of public funds. From the perspective of a benevolent federation, aggregate welfare is reduced with competition-under any choice of policy instruments available to regulators-relative to a cooperative solution, because competition boosts firms' rents in equilibrium. A sophisticated set of instruments allows governments to deal more efficiently with private information, and facilitates redirecting resources to the firms. A system of coarser, non-discretionary, instruments improves welfare because it reduces rents that are granted to firms in equilibrium. We characterize the circumstances under which constitutional constraints are beneficial allowing also for asymmetries between locations.
The study by Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1993) is closely related to ours, although they do not examine the question of instrument choice. In their model, the authors characterize the incentive contracts of principals competing for an agent under adverse selection and moral hazard. Both our models rely on the techniques of price discrimination with nonlinear pricing of Stole (1995) and Spulber (1989) to characterize the equilibrium. This methodology is in the spirit of the standard model of horizontal differentiation of Hotelling (1929) . The outline of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we characterize the equilibrium under two alternative regimes of instruments choice. In section 3 we examine the following benchmarks: the problem of a benevolent federation which chooses where to allocate the firms, and the problem of cooperation between two non-benevolent regulators. We compare the welfare properties of these environments with those of the non-cooperative situation. With a linear-quadratic parameterization of the model, we analyze in section 4 the conditions, with respect to politician's characteristics and differences across locations, under which constitutional constraints are called for. In section 5, we summarize our results and conclude. Proofs can be found in an appendix.
The Model
There are 2 locations governed by politicians competing to attract firms whose output provides benefits to local residents. Firms have private information about their productivity, i.e., politicians face adverse selection.
Regulators in location i = 1, 2 offer incentive programs in the form of recommended output and transfers, {q i , t i }.
The surplus generated to local consumers and the rents to a firm choosing to locate in jurisdiction i are defined as follows:
The benefits function S i is assumed to be concave in q, with S i q > 0 and S i< 0; λ > 0 is the social cost of public funds and is assumed to be the same across locationsd; c i is the cost function of the firm. This formulation has been used, among others, by Laffont (1996) and Martimort (1996b) . The objective of each local government is to maximize a measure of the residents' welfare, including the firms' rents, in their location. Firms are indexed by a cost parameter θ ∈ [0, ∆]; this parameter is private information, and its distribution is given by a publicly known cumulative distribution function, F (θ), with continuous density f (θ).
Locations can be identified with the extremes of the interval [0, ∆] . We denote the location to the left as community 1.
Firms exhibit horizontal attachment to locations in the sense that costs of production are directly related to the distance from position θ to each location: for a firm of type θ ∈ [0, ∆], we denote by θ 1 = θ the cost parameter it obtains in location 1 and by θ 2 = ∆ − θ 1 , the cost parameter the firm obtains in location 2. The distributions of θ 1 and θ 2 are given by
This structure represents trade practices that are specific to the location's set of amenities. Mezzetti (1997) uses a similar structure in a model of common agency where the agent has different abilities at performing the tasks required by two different principals.
Assumption 1 (Single-crossing)
Production costs are given by c i (q, θ i ), which satisfies
This condition is standard: costs and marginal costs increase with the distance from locations, and when c 1 = c 2 , a firm with θ i < θ j faces higher costs in location j than in location i; it is used to ensure truthful revelation. The superscript i in the cost function allows for differences in productivity across locations associated with local amenities: for example, in the case we examine in Section 4, we have c
Assumption 2 (Heterogeneity)
The extent of heterogeneity across locations is restricted as follows: for each location i = 1, 2 and rival community −i = i,
Given the structure of horizontal attachment on the firms, this assumption guarantees that for any given location it is socially more efficient for the firm with the strongest attachment (θ i = 0) to locate there than at the competitor's community (θ −i = ∆). This assumption is used to establish existence of the Nash equilibrium.
Policy programs define the range of firms that choose each location; in addition, depending on the prevailing regime of available instruments, contracts have to satisfy relevant incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints, which in this case, are determined endogenously as a function of the firms' type, given the programs offered by the rival jurisdiction. The firms' value of no participation is normalized to zero.
Non-benevolence of Politicians
An important part of our analysis is to model politicians in each community as displaying non-benevolence. We do it by making assumptions on the objective function of local governments.
As in the standard problem of regulating a monopolistic firm (see for example Baron and Myerson, 1982) , politicians maximize a weighted sum of the resident consumers' surplus and the rents of firms which choose their location. Weights in this objective function reflect the extent of non-benevolence.
The objective of a politician of type ρ ∈ (0, 1) in community i is given by:
where θ i denotes the marginal type that delimits the segment of firms the politician is attempting to attract: θ i ≤ θ i . We will show that in equilibrium, the set of firms that choose community 1 is of the form [0, θ 1 ] and the set of those which choose community 2 is of the form [θ 2 , ∆]. We will also show that in the relevant case, where regulators' choices conflict,
We assume that both the type of politicians (ρ) and the social cost of public funds (λ) are the same across locations. In the following section, we show that ρ = 1 2 represents nonbenevolence, in the sense that with ρ > 1 2 the regulator overestimates the cost of public funds, λ, and with ρ < 1 2 , the regulator underestimates it. This structure can be motivated as in Boyer and Laffont (1999) , where different politicians who alternate in power represent the interest of majorities with different stakes on the firms' rents.
Regulators face different kinds of restrictions regarding the firms' rents, depending on the regime of policy instruments they face; however, a non-negativity constraint on the consumers' surplus, CS i ≥ 0, prevails in both regimes. This constraint puts an upperbound on the information rents that a politician can offer to the firms in her location; it can be triggered for the location that is least able to generate surplus, when locations are heterogeneous, or for both for communities, when the regulators' perception of the social cost of transfers is small. In the next section we characterize the equilibria of the competition outcomes assuming the constraint does not bind for any regulator; this allows us to simplify the exposition of the two alternative regimes, but it does not undermine the intuition of the main results. When we compare the welfare characteristics of alternative regimes of instruments choice in sections 3 and 4, we do so from the perspective of a benevolent federation (setting ρ = 1 2 ) which accurately accounts for the social cost of public funds and chooses incentive programs to solve the following problem:
To compare alternative constitutional regimes, we construct the consumers' surplus and the firms' rents implied by the choice of instruments available in each regime and evaluate them as in the objective function of the federation.
Sophisticated contracts
Our model with sophisticated contracts builds upon Spulber's (1989) as presented in section 3.1 of Stole (1995) . In this regime, politicians in each location use direct revelation mechanisms to compete-contracts are discretionary and provide incentives that depend on the firms' report of their cost parameter-and thus face incentive compatibility constraints. Considering competition with direct revelation mechanisms is not without loss of generality since it does not guarantee that the revelation principle holds. If the revelation principle does not hold, we cannot guarantee that it is enough to work as if locations freely chose direct revelation mechanisms to compete. In that case, our analysis would have to interpret competition with such mechanisms as another form of constitutional constraints.
1
Jurisdictions offer direct revelation contracts {t i (θ i ), q i (θ i )} in terms of the firm's report on its typeθ i . We denote information rents obtained by firm of type θ i in community i from making a reportθ i by
and we let
be the payoff from truthful revelation. Incentive compatibility (henceforth IC) and individual rationality (henceforth IR) constraints for types θ i are given by
We now examine these constraints in detail. The next lemma (an adaptation of Lemma 1 in Stole, 1995) shows that the schedule of firms rents, U i (θ i ), is strictly decreasing in the position parameter, and thus compatibility incentives will be provided if the firm chooses location i; furthermore, the individual rationality constraint will bind only for the marginal type, which, in equilibrium, will be indifferent between either location. Thus, in the equilibrium with direct mechanisms, IC and IR are only relevant for types which actually choose the location in question.
Lemma 1 Given the rival location's contract,
, and reports its type truthfully iff:
The individual rationality constraint in equation (2.5b) can be replaced by
The marginal type, θ i , in location i, is such that types θ i > θ i either choose location −i or do not participate.
Virtual Surplus
A standard technique in problems of mechanism design is to restate the optimization problem of the principal in terms of a virtual surplus function that satisfies certain regularity conditions (see Myerson, 1979) . In the appendix we show that the problem of principal i can be restated as choosing output recommendation and the marginal type:
where, . We assume that γ > 0, which implies that, even with politicians' misperception, transfers involve a positive social cost. This requirement, although technical, can be interpreted as limiting the extent of non-benevolence.
The virtual surplus function Φ i accounts for the distortions in the social surplus of each location induced by the firms' private information, which is costly. As in the standard problem with only one principal, we will see that in order to reduce information rents, regulators have to recommend underproduction from all firm types with respect to the fullinformation case, except from the most efficient one, which has θ i = 0. Notice that regulators take into account the choices of the rival location by including the participation constraint on the marginal type,
choices of marginal types, θ i , have to be consistent.
Assumption 3 (Regularity of Φ)
For all (q, θ) and i,
i has a unique interior maximum in q.
These assumptions are standard and not too restrictive: (i) Φ We now outline the timing of the game between the principals. In a first stage they announce simultaneously incentive programs to the firms. In a second stage, firms choose incentive programs and decide where to operate. Finally, firms report their type truthfully in the location they have chosen and payoffs are realized.
Equilibrium
We now define our equilibrium and characterize it.
Definition 1 A Nash equilibrium for the competition game is given by (i) policy programs for each location {t i (θ i ), q i (θ i )}, (ii) marginal types {θ 1 ,θ 2 }, and (iii) rents for the marginal types {U 1 (θ 1 ), U 2 (θ 2 )}, such that:
} are the solution to the optimization problem of location i in equation (2.7) and satisfy IC and IR for all θ i ≤ θ i , given the programs for the rival community.
(b) {θ 1 ,θ 2 } and {U 1 (θ 1 ), U 2 (θ 2 )} are consistent with IC and IR in each community.
Proposition 1 (Stole 1995) . Under assumptions 2-3, there exists a Nash equilibrium in the competition game with contracts
(ii)The optimal choice of the marginal type θ i is given by
(iii) Marginal types {θ 1 , θ 2 } are such that either a) communities are isolated, in which case, U i (θ i ) = 0, and θ i is determined by
12)
for i = 1, 2, and θ 1 + θ 2 = ∆.
(iv) In both cases,
We have two possible situations derived from the horizontal differentiation of firm types. In the first, when regulators decide which segment of firm types they will attempt to attract, their choice of marginal firm does not conflict with their rival's-regulators will clearly not attempt to attract all firms in every case, since firms farther from their location are more inefficient-and a segment of types [θ 1 , 1 − θ 2 ] will not operate in any location. In this case, regulators provide appropriate incentives for truthful revelation, but are free to set the rent of the marginal firm to zero. In the second situation, the regulators' choice of marginal types conflict with one another; competition imposes upward pressure on the rents of the marginal firm and therefore on the information rents that are provided to more efficient ones to induce truthful revelation; thus, since transfers are socially costly, a constitutional regime where regulators are not allowed to discriminate among firm types may have welfareimproving consequences, because although competition will still boost the rents of marginal firms, higher rents to more efficient ones will not be necessary.
Uniform contracts
In the second regime, politicians are constrained to using uniform contracts-they have to offer the same transfer and recommended output to all firm types. Contracts offered by locations in this case are of the form {t i , q i }. In our current setup, this constraint may limit the rents that are granted to marginal types and therefore to more efficient types. If we considered only one principal, an analogous situation would be to subject a regulated monopoly to set uniform prices, as opposed to using second-degree price discrimination.
With uniform contracts, the next lemma shows that IR binds only at the marginal type.
Lemma 2 Given location −i's contract, IR in equation (2.5b) binds only at the marginal type in location i, θ i , and can be replaced by
Objective Function
In the case of uniform contracts, local governments are not concerned about providing incentives to extract the firms' private information, that is, they do not face an incentivecompatibility constraint, and their problem can be reduced to choosing recommended a output, q i . They do face, however, the endogenous individual rationality constraint. In the appendix we show that using the analogous integral representation of U i (θ i ), as in equation (2.6a), we can restate the regulators' problem using the same technique as with the virtual surplus function; the problem is now
14)
We now restate our definition of equilibrium for the current case and characterize it.
Definition 2 A Nash equilibrium for the competition game under uniform contracts is given by: (i) policy programs for each location {t i , q i }, (ii) marginal types {θ 1 , θ 2 }, and (iii) rents for the marginal types {U 1 (θ 1 ), U 2 (θ 2 )}, such that:
(a) {t i , q i } are the solution to the optimization problem of location i in equation (2.14) and satisfy IR for all θ i ≤ θ i , given the programs for the rival community.
(b) {θ 1 , θ 2 } and {U 1 (θ 1 ), U 2 (θ 2 )} are consistent with IR in each community.
Proposition 2 Under assumptions 2-3, there is a Nash equilibrium in the competition game, with contracts {t i , q i } for i = 1, 2, characterized as follows: (i) q i is obtained from the first order condition
(ii) The optimal choice of the marginal type θ i is given by
(iii) Marginal types {θ 1 , θ 2 } are such that either (a) communities are isolated, in which case, U i (θ i ) = 0, and {q i , θ i } are jointly determined 18b) and θ 1 + θ 2 < ∆ or (b) communities compete, in which case, U 1 (θ 1 ) = U 2 (θ 2 ) = U , and {q 1 , q 2 , θ 1 , θ 2 , U } are jointly determined from
and (2.20a)
It turns out that we need additional conditions on Φ i and F to insure uniqueness of the equilibrium; the details are in the proof in the appendix.
Benchmark Problems
In this section we analyze the general welfare characteristics of our environment. We examine three different cases determining the allocation of firms across the two locations, and we consider the solutions of these problems under full and asymmetric information. In the first case, a benevolent federation maximizes social welfare in the economy by choosing incentive programs and marginal types in each location. In the second case, the two non-benevolent regulators collude to maximize joint welfare. Finally, in the third case we characterize the full information environment of competition-the asymmetric information environment is analyzed with a parameterization of the model in section 4. After establishing these benchmarks, we draw some conclusions on the comparison with the non-cooperative outcomes.
Benevolent Federation

Full Information
With an isolated community, letting the superscript F stand for full information and under full discretion in the choice of instruments, after substituting
the problem of the federation is:
The first term in square brackets is the social surplus. We can see that λ > 0 implies that in the solution, firms' rents will be zero, since the relevant IR constraint is Output levels are constrained-efficient-since they maximize the social surplus subject to the constraint of using distortionary taxation-and the marginal type is determined so that its contribution to the social surplus vanishes.
When there are two communities the objective is to maximize the sum of the communities' welfare:
In this problem, the federation takes into account differences in the communities' capacity to generate surplus, and once it determines the segment of firms that have to operate in each location, it chooses output levels to maximize the community's social surplus, and firms' rents are set to zero as before. The choice of marginal types is outlined next. Define θ * i ∈ [0, ∆] as the solution to
if it exists, otherwise, let θ * i = ∆; q 
(3.5)
Asymmetric Information
With asymmetric information, the federation is subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints. Clearly, in this case, the revelation principle does holdbecause there is only one principal-and we can characterize the optimal mechanism with direct revelation contracts. Modifying our definition of the virtual surplus function in equation (2.8) to account for ρ = 1 2 , and noticing that the participation constraints bind only at the marginal types with U i (θ i ) = 0 for i = 1, 2, we can state the problem of the federation as:
The solution can be found applying the appropriate modifications to the results of Proposition 1; the characterization of q i is given by (3.8) and the marginal types {θ 1 , θ 2 } are determined with two cases: a) Isolated communities, in which case, θ 1 + θ 2 < ∆, and θ i is determined by
b) Interacting communities, where θ 1 = ∆ − θ 2 is the unique solution 3 to:
(3.10)
Collusion 3.2.1 Full Information
In this case, since transfers are costly, the solution coincides with the benevolent federation; all firms receive zero rents; the recommended levels of output maximize the social surplus in each community, and the marginal types are defined as in equations (3.4)-(3.5). Strictly speaking, in this situation we cannot interpret ρ as inducing misperception of the cost of public funds, λ, because its presence does not affect the efficiency of resulting output levels-which requires knowing λ. In welfare terms, this regime is identical to the benevolent federation.
Asymmetric Information
Unification, or collusion, allows communities to eliminate the rents of the marginal type, but incentives offered in each location have to satisfy incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints. In the solution, unified locations decide first on the set of firms that each is going to attract, and provide the corresponding incentives derived in Proposition 1. The marginal types are chosen as in equations (2.11)-(2.12). We then state:
Proposition 3 Under private information, the collusion regime is superior in welfare terms to the competition case in which discretionary incentives are used, while it is inferior to the outcome under the benevolent federation.
The reason it that politicians are non-benevolent under collusion. In the case of the benevolent federation, incentives q f ed i (θ i ) are determined from the following first order condition:
whereas in the case of collusion, incentives q col i (θ i ) are determined from:
for each θ, the left-hand side in each equation is decreasing in q, and the right-hand side is non-negative and increasing in q. Intuitively, the misperception of the social cost of public funds induces inefficiencies relative to the benevolent federation's problem: γ > λ implies that costs of transfers are overestimated and underproduction is recommended to reduce information rents needed to induce truthful revelation; on the other hand, γ < λ implies that costs of transfers are underestimated and overproduction is required to provide incentives to the firms.
Competition under Full Information
In the relevant case, where the choices of regulators conflict, under full information, the results will not be efficient because competition creates upward pressures on the rents of the marginal firm, which implies that rents for all firm types will be strictly positive. Since there are no information problems in this case, once a community is able to attract a firm, the recommended output is the efficient full information level obtained in equation (3.2a). We can still-to some degree-interpret ρ as inducing misperception of the social cost of transfers because it is still relevant in determining the rents of the marginal type.
The objective function of any community is given by (3.13) and the first order condition for the choice of θ i is
Clearly, regardless of the presence of γ, marginal types in the Nash equilibrium are deter-mined as in equations (3.4)-(3.5); if θ * 1 + θ * 2 < ∆, locations do not interact, and the solution is efficient since locations can set U (θ i ) = 0. In the relevant case, where θ * 1 + θ * 2 ≥ ∆, communities interact and the firms' rents are determined as follows:
Since U 1 is decreasing in θ and U 2 is increasing in θ, θ 1 < θ * 1 implies that U 1 (θ 1 ) = U > 0.
Therefore, in this environment the rents for all firms are strictly positive:
In welfare terms, this regime is inferior to both the benevolent federation and collusion because of the firms' rents, even though production levels are efficient, and even under full information there may be advantages to imposing constraints on discretionary instruments.
Summary
In general, competition outcomes are not efficient, even under full information, because firms enjoy positive rents. With private information, output levels do not coincide with the solution of the benevolent federation because of the non-benevolence of politicians, which distorts the regulators' perception of the costs of information. It is also true that according to the federation's welfare criterion, the outcome of competition is inferior under any regime-uniform or discretionary-to the outcome of collusion among non-benevolent politicians because collusion allows communities to set costly information rents of the marginal types equal to zero. In general, however, collusion outcomes are not sustainable as Nash equilibria of the competition game, and a benevolent authority with the powers to regulate competition and interested in improving welfare faces the problem of choosing the appropriate rules of the game between locations.
Alternative Regimes of Competition
In order to analyze the problem of instruments choice from the perspective of the benevolent federation, we resort to a parameterization of the model that allows for closed-form solutions and helps provide some intuition on the trade-offs driving the outcomes of the competition process between locations. In particular, we are interested in analyzing the implications of imposing constitutional constraints when locations are heterogeneous. In what follows, we derive the incentives offered by the politicians in each location, under each alternative regime of instrument choice; we characterize the marginal types, the incentives offered by locations, and the rents of marginal types.
We use a quadratic function for the benefits from the firms' output, a linear function for the firms' costs, and the uniform distribution for the firms' types on the interval [0, 1].
The choice of ∆ = 1 is a normalization and establishes a reference point. In particular, with the linear-quadratic formulation, we obtain the following characterization of the social cost of public funds:
, for all i.
Full information case Optimal choice of incentives
In this case it is immediate to obtain the following characterization:
Optimal choice of marginal types Given our current assumptions, it can be shown that the relevant case is interaction between locations; since, following the definitions of equation (3.4) and by assumption 2, q
Thus the marginal type is derived as in equation (3.5):
.
, i.e., the location which generates more surplus from production will attract the larger segment of firm types.
Asymmetric information 4.2.1 Sophisticated Contracts
If politicians are granted discretion by the constitution in the choice of instruments for the design of industrial policy, they tailor type-specific contracts to induce firms to operate in their location; additionally, such contracts have to induce truthful revelation of the firms' type and meet the endogenous participation constraint of the marginal firm.
Choice of incentives
The choice of output functions and marginal types is determined as in the optimization problem of equation (2.7), where now
from the first order condition Φ i q = 0, we obtain the recommended output levels:
where the superscript S stands for sophisticated contracts. The output function is decreasing in firm types:
this implies that contracts satisfy IC. Clearly, production is inefficient with respect to the full information solution because of the cost of extracting information from the firms:
; it is also inefficient with respect to the federation choice of output because of non-benevolence, as we have outlined before.
Choice of marginal types
The marginal types that obtain in equilibrium are given by either of two cases: if communities are isolated, we have that θ * i is obtained from setting q 
In the more interesting case of conflicting choices of the politicians, we obtain the marginal type as in Proposition 1. Letting κ = 1 + λ, we can verify that
(4.5) Some intuition is in order: q
(1) measures the relative difference in the productive capabilities of jurisdictions; the segment of firm types is [0, 1]; therefore, since the denominator in the second term is positive, 4 q
(1) implies that location 1 has greater capacity of generating surplus-and thus transfers-and attracts a larger set of firms.
Uniform Contracts
Choice of incentives
For the case of uniform programs we have that incentive programs {t i , q i } are the same for all firm types; we use the procedure of Proposition 2 to derive them. With our current functional forms, and letting the superscript U stand for uniform contracts, the first order condition for the choice of output is:
Output is constant for all firm types, but if we think only about the marginal type to gain some intuition, q U i recommends overproduction for the marginal type, with respect to using sophisticated contracts:
For the derivation of the marginal type, we need to think of q U i as a function of θ U i , which, as required to prove existence of the equilibrium, is decreasing:
This follows because overproduction, with respect to using discretionary incentives, q
The following is immediate:
Proposition 4 Recommended output levels at the marginal type of the uniform regime are ordered as follows:
. 4 We can check that (2γ + κ)(q 
Choice of marginal types
In order to obtain the marginal types for the case of communities in isolation we have the following first order condition:
For q U i (θ * i ) > 0, the solution is given by:
Now for the case of communities interacting, we have that (q
2 ), and θ U 2 = 1 − θ U 1 and substitute them in the first order conditions for each principal as in equations (2.19a)-(2.19b). We can verify that after some manipulation:
(4.8)
The same intuition discussed for the marginal type under sophisticated contracting applies here; additionally, we notice that q
and therefore:
Proposition 5 The use of discretionary incentives allows the more productive community to attract a larger segment of firms than in the case of competition with non-discretionary instruments.
The reason is that politicians in the sophisticated case can tailor incentives in a more efficient manner: recommending more production for firms with lower cost.
Differences in Welfare
We identify next the conditions that in our framework call for different kinds of constraints, from the perspective of a benevolent federation.
5 The functional forms we have selected allow us to derive closed-form-albeit involved-expressions for the measures of welfare in the different regimes; and we are able to derive local results for identical and heterogeneous locations when politicians are benevolent. When we examine competition between locations with identical productive capabilities, we find that the uniform regime improves aggregate welfare because it reduces the rents that are granted to firms in the equilibrium. When we examine competition between heterogeneous locations, we find that if the extent of the asymmetry between locations increases, the advantages of the uniform regime decrease and can be overturned. Intuitively, if locations differ in productivity, although there is social waste because of information rents in the discretionary regime, the constant structure of production in the uniform regime may prevent society from acquiring more of the surplus it is capable of generating.
In the appendix we present the analytical expressions for welfare and rents for the marginal firm type in each regime. As we mentioned before, we compute the consumer surplus and firm rents implied for each firm type and aggregate across locations using the criterion of the benevolent federation.
Definition 3 Define dW = W U − W S as the measure for comparing regimes, where Let U S and U U denote the rents for the marginal firm type in each regime, and define
Symmetric communities
When locations have identical productive capabilities, α 1 = α 2 and δ 1 = δ 2 , it is not possible to unambiguously sign the expression for dW ; in particular the expression for dW depends only on ρ and λ. Intuitively, the marginal types θ
allow for several simplifications; in particular, we notice that differences in production levels for the marginal type depend only on ρ and λ :
Proposition 6 When politicians are benevolent, ρ = 1 2 , switching from a discretionary regime to using uniform incentives programs is welfare improving:
(4.10)
We began discussing the intuition for this result in section 3. The horizontal structure of the firm types implies that the strength of competition can be reduced to one parameter: the rents of the marginal type, U . We have that although incentives in the discretionary regime, q S i (θ i ), are provided efficiently-subject to facing the problem of private information:
Proposition 7 With benevolent politicians, competitive pressures raise U S above the levels in the uniform regime, U U : ), it can be shown that the discretionary regime improves upon the case with uniform incentives, only if the cost of public funds is small.
Asymmetric communities
The important question in this situation is whether constitutional constraints-in the form of eliminating discretionary incentives, and aimed at reducing the distortions from the information rents imposed by competition-are justified when communities differ in their capacity to generate surplus, for example, when there are differences in amenities that impact productivity.
When we examine differences in benefits and cost functions we obtain the following local result. , and we let α 1 = φα 2 and δ 1 = ηδ 2 , then the gain in welfare implied by the uniform regime of constraints on instrument choice is a concave function in the extent of asymmetry between locations; furthermore, the gain in welfare reaches a maximum when locations are identical; that is, (i) for φ close to 1, ∂(dW ) ∂φ = 0, and
(ii) for η close to 1,
= 0, and
The gain in welfare implied by resorting to a system of uniform contracts may be important because it reduces the distortions induced by competitive pressures on the rent of marginal types. A regime of coarser instruments thus reduces one important source of distortions-particularly when regulators are non-benevolent-at the cost of interfering with other margins: output choices.
Our last result implies that the potentially welfare-improving properties of constitutional constraints on instrument choice has limits: if asymmetries between locations are important, for example if α 1 > α 2 or δ 1 < δ 2 , attempting to attenuate one unfavorable aspect of competition-costly rents for the marginal type-may be harmful if it prevents the more productive location from attracting those types which would be more efficient in it, since, in this case: θ S 1 > θ U 1 . In such cases, the regime with sophisticated contracts may be superior. This intuition can be extended to the case of non-benevolent regulators, at least in the case in which ρ > 1 2 , since then the rents involved in the regime of sophisticated contracts are likely to be smaller than when regulators are benevolent-because politicians overestimate the social cost of transfers.
An implication of our results is that intervention of a benevolent authority in terms of establishing the rules of competition among independent states may not be warranted if rival governments are too dissimilar in, for example, natural amenities-even if states behave with benevolence. If rival states are not too different, however, constitutional constraints on the choice of instruments may have welfare-improving merits.
Conclusion
In this paper we develop a model of competition between two regulators under asymmetric information. Politicians in each state are concerned with attracting firms to generate local surplus. Firms have private information on their productivity and rents have to be provided to induce truthful revelation.
Since rents are socially costly, we can summarize the extent of the distortions of the competition process with the rents that are provided to the marginal firm in equilibrium. Given a horizontal structure of firms' attachment to locations, such middle types are among the least efficient for each state and would receive zero rents if rival states colluded.
We evaluate the welfare properties of alternative regimes according to the criterion of a benevolent federation. Under full information, the outcome of the federation and collusion of non-benevolent states is identical when using fully discretionary contracts because centralization allows the regulators to eliminate the rents of the marginal firm.
Under asymmetric information, the outcome of the federation beats the outcome of collusion, because the misperception of the social cost of public funds of non-benevolent politicians leads to distorted output recommendations.
Outcomes of competition are inferior to outcomes under collusion. However, collusion cannot be sustained as a Nash equilibrium of the competition game. The evaluation of alternative competition regimes is relevant if we think that the federation would not attempt to enforce collusion.
Competition under discretionary contracts bids up the rents of the marginal type relative to uniform contracts: this may be an important source of distortions depending on the shadow price of public funds, and specially for identical communities, the model suggests a strong case for imposing constitutional constraints. When transfers are costly, and regulators are benevolent, uniform programs improve welfare with respect to the regime of sophisticated contracts, because coarser instruments depress the rents that are granted to the marginal type in equilibrium. This is not without a cost-output choices are distorted.
When communities are heterogeneous, the gains in welfare of resorting to constraints on the instruments of industrial policy is concave in the extent of the asymmetry between locations. This suggests that discretionary contracts may be welfare-improving in order to account for the natural differences in locations' amenities, since when one location is more productive, restricting competition prevents it from attracting the firm types that are socially more efficient in it. Thus, in this case, prohibiting the use of sophisticated instruments may have adverse consequences. The intuition can be extended to the case of non-benevolent regulators.
In our model, the basic inefficiency under the sophisticated regime is given by the costly rents that are provided to firms in equilibrium. Intuitively, these inefficiencies would be reduced with respect to the uniform regime if the number of competing jurisdictions were to increase, since the variability of firm types attached to each community would decrease because the segment of firms attached to each location would shrink. Therefore, the gains from resorting to the non-discretionary system would also decrease. Nonetheless, as long as the structure of imperfect competition among locations is preserved, the outcome under either regime would continue to be inefficient, except in the extreme case where there is one location for each firm type. While in our model we have an interpretation for types of politicians in terms of nonbenevolence and their efficiency at raising public funds, in the current state of our analysis we maintain that such type is the same across locations. This work is being extended to allow jurisdictions to have different types of governments, including a numerical characterization of the results.
An interesting extension to our model that we leave for future research is the analysis of fiscal federalism, particularly with respect to identifying the roles of central and lower level governments in the design of industrial policy. We can interpret our framework as modelling competition among different government branches or agencies in charge of regulating the same social entity, and we can think of jurisdictions as the constituency whose interests are represent by each agency. In addition to analyzing alternative rules of competition, in a more general framework, we could evaluate alternative degrees of vertical decentralization and analyze competition among several agencies and between different levels in a vertical structure of regulatory powers. Proof of Proposition 1.
Suppose that each community attracts types θ i ≤ θ i , in the optimization problem in (2.7), the unique pointwise maximum of Φ i is given by Φ i q = 0; Φ i qθ < 0 implies that the solution q i is nonincreasing in θ i , and therefore the program
Because of the structure of horizontal attachment of firms to locations in terms of costs, it is not necessarily true that local governments wish to attract all types of firms, and thus the marginal type is a choice variable. In the case of an isolated community, the optimal choice follows from setting the rents of the marginal type to its reservation value and finding the type at which the (virtual) surplus vanishes, since rents are costly. Let θ * i be the solution to We have seen before that IC implies that IR will bind only for the marginal type, and in this case we have that the type region will be split between communities, i.e., the set of firms in [0, θ 1 ] will choose location 1, and those in [θ 1 , ∆] will join location 2. The relevant reservation value is now U 1 (θ 1 ) = U 2 (θ 2 ) = U ≥ U 0 ≡ 0, and is determined endogenously, along with θ 1 . We subtract the conditions in equation (2.12) for i = 1, 2, substitute θ 2 = ∆ − θ 1 , and define: With these conditions in hand, we can guarantee that the Nash equilibrium exists since ξ is continuous. Uniqueness follows as long as ξ is strictly decreasing in θ 1 . The expression for ξ (θ 1 ) is given by ξ = Φ 
In order to check that the marginal types are chosen optimally, we notice that because U i is strictly decreasing in θ i and U −i is strictly increasing in θ i , we have two cases: isolation or competition. In the case of isolation, marginal types and output {q * Claim 3 q(θ) <q(θ) ∀θ.
Proof. We have Φ i ( q(θ), θ) = 0, then Ψ i ( q(θ), θ) = ργ , with σ > 1, we obtain the following the expression:
((6σ − 5)λ + 11σ − 10)((2σ − 1)λ + 3σ − 2) σ(σ − 1)(2 + λ) < 0.
Benevolent Politicians
Substituting for ρ = 1 2 in the above expression for dW we obtain: dW = 2(1 + 2λ) (8λ + 1) 192 > 0.
Heterogeneous locations
Sketch of Proof of Proposition 8. Assumption 2 implies max q S i (q) − (1 + λ)c i (q, 1) > 0∀i, which is equivalent to
We can then express λ = πλ * , where π ∈ (0, 1) parameterizes the range λ ∈ (0, λ * ), and substitute in the expression for dW . When we obtain the corresponding derivatives with respect to either φ or η, we then evaluate the expression at either φ = 1 or η = 1; factorization in terms of λ * leaves polynomials in π, which can be easily signed.
